Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 10

1-1-2002

Does Anyone Know the Required State of Mind: The Uncertainty
Created by the Vagueness of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995
Justin M. Fabella
Suffolk University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.suffolk.edu/jtaa-suffolk
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
7 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 81 (2002)

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Suffolk. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy by an authorized editor of Digital Collections @ Suffolk.
For more information, please contact dct@suffolk.edu.

DOES ANYONE KNOW THE REQUIRED STATE OF
MIND?: THE UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY THE

VAGUENESS OF THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the pleading standard for the state of mind element of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)?' The PSLRA
fails to provide any guidelines that would unearth the state of mind
(synonymous with scienter for the purposes of this Note) element required
to successfully plead scienter under the PSLRA and survive a motion to
dismiss.2 When the United States Circuit Courts confront the scienter
element and attempt to construe Congressional intent, a split among the
Circuits inevitably arises.
Congress enacted the PSLRA to deter plaintiffs from filing abusive
class-action lawsuits. 4 The PSLRA displays Congress's intent to place a
higher pleading standard on plaintiffs bringing a securities fraud claim.5 In
actions purporting to violate securities laws, the Circuits have taken
varying positions as to the necessary pleading standard required to prevail
over a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
6
failure to state a claim.

1

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). 78u-4(b)(2) provides in pertinent part:

Required state of mind. In any private action arising under this title [15 USCS §§
78a et seq.] in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that
the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et
seq.], state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.
Id.

2 See id. (omitting what would qualify as state of mind). See also Phillips
v. LCI
Int'l Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting "widespread disagreement" in
determining "required state of mind" because not defined in PSLRA).
3 See In re Silicon Graphics Inc., Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999)
(outlining three different approaches taken by district courts interpreting PSLRA's pleading
requirement).
4 See id. at 973 (construing PSLRA).
5 See id. at 973-74 (describing legislative intent of PSLRA).
6 See id. at 973 (listing different interpretations of Circuits).
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This Note recognizes the need for a uniform pleading standard
among the Circuits construing the PSLRA. Part II outlines the historical
background leading up to the enactment of the PSLRA. Part III details
Congress's intent and goals with respect to the pleading requirements
promulgated by the PSLRA. Part IV illustrates the different interpretations
of the PSLRA's pleading standard among the Circuit Courts. Finally, Part
V concludes with an analysis of the several interpretations and suggests a
uniform pleading standard that reflects Congress's intent.
II. HISTORY
Congress promulgated the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) in response to the public's
negative feelings towards securities markets following the Stock Market
Crash of 1929. 7 The 1933 Act aimed to counteract fraud and the perceived
lack of public information in the securities markets by mandating full and
fair disclosure of all information that is material to the markets. 8 The 1934
Act, namely § 10b, proposed to obviate the manipulation of stock prices by
regulating securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets. 9
In 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), acting
under the regulatory power inherited through § 10b of the 1934 Act,
promulgated Rule lOb-5, which establishes a private cause of action for §
10b violations. 10 To support an action under § 10(b) and 10(b)-5, a

7 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976) (explaining
legislative history of both 1933 and 1934 Acts).
8 See id. (discussing Congress's intent in passing Acts); 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000)

(statin one purpose to "insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets").
See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (confirming 1934 Act and § 10b purported to
eliminate fraud in markets). The 1934 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... (b) to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or ... deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
10 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
Section 240. 1Ob-5 provides;
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or articles to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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defendant is required to have acted with scienter." The United States
Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,12 defined scienter
as "a
3
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.'
The Second Circuit case Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp14 interpreted
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and established a private cause of
action. 15 Shields later became known as the "Second Circuit test" and
heightened the existing standard by holding that the facts must additionally
indicate a "strong inference" of fraud to establish scienter.16 The Second
Circuit test sets forth that a "strong inference" of fraud can be established
either by alleging facts that show the defendants possessed both motive
and opportunity to commit fraud or by alleging facts that constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. 17 The
Second Circuit's "strong inference" requirement became the scienter test
employed by many of the federal courts.'8
III. THE PSLRA AND ITS GOALS
Act.' 9

On December 2, 1995, the PSLRA officially amended the 1934
The House Conference Report expressly states that Congress

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78j (creating Congressional regulatory power with regard to Rule
10b).
11See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 (holding no private cause of action for damages
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 without scienter); Shields v. Citytrust Bankcorp, Inc., 25 F.3d
1124, 1127-28 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) scienter requirements avoid
claims of fraud based on speculation); Freidberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42,
47-48 (D. Mass 1997) (noting requirement of scienter under Section lOb and Rule 1Ob-5).
12 425 U.S. 185 (1975).
13 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12 (1976).
14 25 F.3d 1124(2dCir. 1994).
15 Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994); FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000). Rule 9(b) states that the Plaintiff must state facts with
particularity and that malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of scienter can be
asserted. Id.
16 Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128 (setting scienter requirements referenced by
all Circuits
and followed by most).
17 Id. See also In re Carter-Wallace, Inc., 220 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir.
2000) (citing
Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128).
18 See In re Criimi Mae, Inc. Sec. Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d 652, 657-58 (D. Md.
2000)
(employing Second Circuit test); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d
Cir. 1999) (stating Second Circuit test as rule of all Circuits); Lirette v. Shiva Corp., 27 F.
Supp. 2d 268, 275 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing Second Ciruit test as standard for pleading
scienter).
19 Eugene P. Caiola, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the Uniform
Security Litigation Standards of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REv. 309, 326 (2000) (discussing
legislative history of PSLRA).

84

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. VII

attempted to restore confidence in our capital markets through deterring
wrongdoing by corporations and their agents and, ultimately, returning the
securities litigation system into the good graces of the public.20 The
legislative history further indicates that the purpose of the PSLRA was to
prevent the exploitation of deep-pocket defendants in securities classaction litigation.2z Moreover, Congress intended to narrow the filing of
securities suits arising from significant stock price shifts without regard to
the defendant's culpability and eliminate the 22strategic use of the discovery
process to intimidate defendants into settling.
The PSLRA set out the requirements for private securities fraud
actions, providing in pertinent part:
(2) Required state of mind. In any private action arising
under this title ... in which the plaintiff may recover money
damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this title ... state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.23
The Conference Committee ("Committee") clearly indicated its
intent to heighten the existing scienter pleading requirements necessary to
survive a motion to dismiss.24 Although the Second Circuit test was not
codified in the PSLRA, it strongly influenced Congress in drafting the
bill. 25 The Committee borrowed language from the Second Circuit test;
namely, the requirement that the plaintiff must state facts with particularity
that give rise to a "strong inference" of the defendant's fraudulent intent.26
In drafting the PSLRA, the Committee created uncertainty by employing
vague and ambiguous language and refusing to interpret what may qualify

20 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
21

See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (referring to accountants, underwriters and

those covered by insurance policies). See also Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531-32 (explaining
Congressional history and intentions behind PSLRA).
22 See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531 (construing PSLRA to restrict abuses of securities
fraud claims).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
24 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 3 (1995) (seeking to deter plaintiffs lawyers "race to
the courthouse").
25 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (expressly stating Conference Committee did not
intend to codify Second Circuit test); Caiola, supra note 19, at 334-35 (describing debates
within Senate rejecting Second Circuit test). Congress wanted to take steps toward
eliminating frivolous securities claims. Id. at 325. The Second Circuit test provided a
backbone for the PSLRA, but the final language failed to include the required state of mind
or how it was to be proven. Id.
26 id.
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as the defendant's "required state of mind., 27 By virtue of the vague
language, the Committee failed to establish a uniform pleading
requirement because it neglected to provide a framework for a scienter
pleading standard.28
Additionally, the PSLRA complicated matters by requiring a
dismissal of the complaint for a failure to establish the required state of
mind. 29 The Circuit Courts that review a motion to dismiss involving
securities fraud have construed Congress's intent with regard to state of
mind. 30 As a result, various Circuit Courts have either adopted the PSLRA
in its entirety, adopted certain portions, or devised a new, more stringent
standard.3 1
Further complicating matters, Congress passed the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (Standards Act).32 A review of
the Standards Act's legislative history displays Congress's intention to
return to a heightened uniform pleading standard based on the Second
Circuit test. Unfortunately, the passage of the Standards Act failed to
settle the uncertainty among the Circuits in establishing a uniform pleading
standard. 34

27 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (failing to define "state of mind").

Legal commentary on

the PSLRA has analogized Congress's shortcomings in drafting the PSLRA to Pandora's
Box, because of the disarray it has caused in the Circuits. Caiola, supra note 19, at 310.
28 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 973-79 (determining pleading standard as main
issue in PSLRA); In re Comshare, Inc., Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999)
(noting Congress did not define "required state of mind").
15 U.S.C. § 78u(b)(3). The PSLRA states, in pertinent part:
(3) Motion to dismiss, stay of discovery.
(a) Dismissal for failure to meet pleading requirements. In a private action arising
under this title ....
the court shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the
complaint if the requirements of paragraph (1) and (2) are not met.
Id.

30 See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531 (noting how Congress complicated securities fraud
actions by passing PSLRA).
31 See Criimi Mae, 94 F. Supp 2d at 657-58 (listing varied scienter pleading standards
amonp Circuits).
2 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353 (1998).
33 See H.R. REP. No., 105-803, at 13 (1998) (stating Congress intended to raise

pleading standards by passing PSLRA); S. REP. No. 105-182, at 11 (1998) (discussing
Senate hearing regarding impact of PSLRA). The Senate Report provides an interesting
attachment compiled by staff attorneys at the Securities and Exchange Commission entitled,
"Pleading Standard Scorecard." S. REP. No. 105-182, at 26-7. The Scorecard lists several
cases among the federal courts that either adopted the Second Circuit test in its entirety, or
applied a stricter or lesser version or the test. Id.
34 See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533 (reiterating dispute between Senate and House on
whether PSLRA codified Second Circuit test).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERING VIEWS AMONG THE CIRCUITS

A. Second and Third Circuits
The Second and Third Circuits have held that the requisite state of
mind under the PSLRA is at least equal to the Second Circuit standard.35
These Circuits consistently hold that Congress intended to codify the
Second Circuit test with the passage of the PSLRA.36
In Novak v. Kasaks,3 7

the Second

Circuit determined

that

scrutinizing the PSLRA legislative history was unnecessary. 38 Utilizing the
language from the Second Circuit, both the Novak and Advanta Courts held
that the PSLRA's pleading standard was equal to the Second Circuit test
because the PSLRA contained no ambiguity. 39 Language in the Novak
case momentarily altered the established pleading requirement, stating,
"[w]e believe that Congress's failure to include language about motive and
opportunity suggests we need not be wedded to these concepts." 4 The
Novak Court, however, was reacting to lower court challenges, such as the
Southern District of New York's decision In re Beasa Sec. Litig.41, 42 In
Baesa, the Court held that it was unclear whether the Second Circuit has
"always" considered motive and opportunity to be sufficient to establish
scienter.43 The court in Novak, however, attempted to extinguish the
dissent among its immediate districts by directing the district courts to look
35 See Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding

PSLRA heightened pleading standard to level of Second Circuit); Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534
(holding PSLRA codified Second Circuit test).
36 See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (construing Congress
enacted Second Circuit standard adding phrase "with particularity"); Novak v. Kasaks, 216
F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating enactment of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) did not change
pleading standard within Circuit); Advanta, 180 F.3d at 530 (adopting Second Circuit's
pleading standard); Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38 (stating PSLRA raised scienter pleading
requirement to Second Circuit level).
17 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000).
38 Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000).
39 Novak, 216 F.3d at 310; Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534. The Court in Advanta stated the
"use of Second Circuit's language compels the conclusion that the [PSLRA] establishes a
pleading standard approximately equal in stringency to that of the Second Circuit."
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534.
40 Novak, 216F.3dat 310.
41 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
42 See Novak, 216 F.3d at 310 (stating disagreement among district courts
regarding
PSLRA pleading standard).
43 See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (making
reference to commentators with same views). The Court in Baesa held that since the
PSLRA omitted the "motive and opportunity" language of the Second Circuit Standard, the
mere pleading of motive and opportunity will not, alone, sustain a strong inference of
scienter. See id.
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to prior case law to determine if a strong inference existed. 44 Although the
Second Circuit temporarily dealt with this unrest among its own districts
by suggesting the use of stare decisis, it remains a source of controversy in
the other Circuits.45
B. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has had few opportunities to review securities
fraud cases interpreting the PSLRA. When given the opportunity in In re
Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 46 the Ninth Circuit distinguished itself by
concluding that Congress intended to heighten the pleading standards in
excess of the Second Circuit requirement. 47 Therefore, a "plaintiff
proceeding under the PSLRA must plead, in great detail, facts that
constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or
conscious misconduct., 48 The Ninth Circuit followed Congress's express
intent not to codify the Second Circuit Standard and thereby eliminated the
availability of motive and opportunity and simple recklessness as scienter
pleading standards. 49 The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA is
unique because its views are inconsistent and distinguishable from the
other Circuit Courts. °
C. Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
Both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits employ similar pleading
standards under the PSLRA. The similarities are exemplified by the Sixth
5 1 and the Eleventh
Circuit decision In re Comshare, Inc., Sec. Litig.
52
Circuit's holding in Bryant v. Avocado Brands, Inc.

44 See Novak, 216 F.3d at 311 (stating prior decisions provide best indication
of
pleading standard).
45 See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 196-97 (1st Cir.1999) (showing
motive and opportunity not acceptable pleading standard in all Circuits).
46 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
47 See In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 973-74 (9th Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing Ninth Circuit from Second Circuit test by elevating pleading requirement).
4 Id. at 974.
49 See id. at 973 (stating motive and opportunity and simple recklessness may support
reasonable inference of intent). In an effort to raise the pleading standard to exceed the
Second Circuit standard, the Ninth Circuit held that pleading facts of motive and
opportunity, or mere recklessness, does not support a finding of a "strong inference," as the
language of the PSLRA provides. Id.
50 See In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
Ninth Circuit approach best "reconciles" Congress's use of Second Circuit's "strong
inference" standard).
51 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
52 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
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As a case of first impression, the Sixth Circuit in Comshare
reviewed the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA.53 The Court
concluded that plaintiffs may plead scienter by alleging facts that give a
strong inference of recklessness, rather than merely alleging 54facts that
might establish the defendant possessed motive and opportunity.
In Bryant, the Eleventh Circuit considered the necessary standard to
adequately plead scienter within its Circuit. 55 The Circuit, however,
rejected the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test because the clear
text of the statute allows recklessness as a basis of liability.56 Ultimately,
the Bryant court concluded that Congress's definition of the "required state
of mind" for the PSLRA included57recklessness because Congress failed to
expressly exclude it from the Act.
D. First Circuit
The First Circuit's opportunity to determine the post-PSLRA
securities fraud pleading standard arose with Greebel v. FTP Software,
Inc.58,59 The Greebel Court noted that the PSLRA's language was
inadequate because it failed to provide a specific test and did not preclude
the use of different methods to establish scienter. 60 The First Circuit,
however, asserted that its prior-PSLRA requirements for pleading fraud
with particularity were commensurate to6 the intention of the PSLRA
because they were both strict and rigorous. '
The Court in Greebel employed a narrow definition of "reckless"
that could establish scienter.62 This definition depicts recklessness to
53 In re Comshare, Inc., Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 544 (6th Cir. 1999) (reviewing

appeal from dismissed securities fraud action).
54 Id. at 549. See also Baesa, 969 F. Supp at 242 (questioning establishment of
scienter merely by alleging facts of motive and opportunity).
55 See Bryant v. Avocado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating
Court's intention to establish pleading standard).
56 See id. at 1273-74 (stating review of PSLRA legislative history unnecessary
because of plain statutory text).
17 Id. at 1284.
58 194 F.3d 185 (lst Cir. 1999).
59 See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 191-92 (1st Cir. 1999)(reviewing
Second Circuit test to determine pleading standard for First Circuit).
60 See id. at 195 (stating legislative history of PSLRA failed to clearly state pleading
standard). Similar to many other Circuits review of the legislative history of the PSLRA,
the First Circuit stated that Congress was inconclusive on whether the PSLRA meant to
codify or reject the Second Circuit's standard. Id. at 195. In addition, the Court discounted
the legislative history by stating there "appears to be an agreement to disagree." Id.
I See id. at 193 (noting that PSLRA raised pleading standard consistent with First
Circuit's standard). The First Circuit simply adhered to a strict interpretation of Fed. R.
Civ. P. (9)(b). Id.
62 See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198 (1st Cir. 1999) (using
Seventh Circuit's strict definition of recklessness). The Seventh Circuit's definition of
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exclude ordinary negligence by calling for an "extreme" departure from the
standards of ordinary care.63 The First Circuit expressed that its narrow
construction of the PSLRA's pleading standard was justified because other
provisions of the Act, such as the elimination of64recklessness as a basis for
joint and several liability, were also constricted.
E. Fourth Circuit
In Phillips v. LCI International,Inc.,65 the Fourth Circuit noted that
Congress intended to heighten the pleading standard for scienter in a
securities fraud action; however, the Court failed to establish a solid
precedent. 66 Subsequent to reviewing the history of the PSLRA, the Court
proceeded to dismiss the shareholders' claim because it failed to meet even
67
the most lenient standard promulgated by the Second Circuit.
Furthermore, the Court's dicta in Phillips alluded that recklessness will be
sufficient as a pleading standard for scienter.68 The Fourth Circuit,
however, will abstain from deciding the new PSLRA pleading standard
until it is presented with an appeal that would give rise to a strong
inference of scienter established through a genuine factual basis.69
V. CONCLUSION
The scienter pleading standard of the PSLRA is vague, which
creates inconsistent interpretations among the federal courts. Primarily,
Congress can be held responsible for creating the uncertainty among the

recklessness provides, in pertinent part:
Reckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving
not merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence, but an extreme departure
from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious the actor
must have been aware of it.
Id. (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)).
63 See id. at 197 (stating "reckless" more like lesser form of intent than merely greater
degree of negligence).
64 See id. (mentioning "safe harbor" provision of PSLRA also amended 1933 Act).
The "safe harbor" provision allows a defendant to make forward-looking statements, unless
he/she had actual knowledge that the statement was false and misleading. Id.
65 190 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 1999).
66 See Phillips v. LCI International, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999)
(expressing PSLRA establishes higher standards to survive motion to dismiss).
67 Id. at 620-21.
"8 See id. at 620 (quoting, "to establish scienter, a plaintiff must still prove that the
defendant acted intentionally, which may perhaps be shown by recklessness").
69 See id. at 621-22 (emphasizing minimum standard to satisfy pleading requirement
to overcome motion to dismiss).
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courts because it failed to define the pleading standard. Congress's
uncertainty in drafting the PSLRA, coupled with the courts refusal to
adhere to the same pleading standards, have fostered the split among the
Circuit Courts.
Moreover, only a limited number of PSLRA cases involving the
interpretation of the pleading standard have reached appellate review. Thus
the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have never interpreted the
scienter element. Barring an act of Congress, it is fairly certain that these
Circuits will interpret the scienter element of the PSLRA; thus, the
additional uncertainty may be unavoidable.
The ambiguity with regard to the PSLRA's scienter element and the
resulting disagreement among the Circuits will continue to result in
inconsistent holdings in the lower District Courts. Congress must
acknowledge its mistake and amend the PSLRA to clearly define the
pleading standard, thereby eliminating the uncertainty and inconsistency
among the Federal Courts.
To eliminate the uncertainty, Congress should take the appropriate
steps to codify the Second Circuit test for scienter, thereby making the
pleading standard more consistent among the federal courts. The Second
Circuit test should ultimately be the standard for scienter because Congress
used this test as a guide in drafting the PSLRA and the Circuits already
recognize and refer to this test in their decisions. The codification of the
Second Circuit test will, without fail, alleviate congestion on the courts'
dockets and effectively deter frivolous law suits in the continuously
evolving securities markets.
Justin M. Fabella

